Introduction
The question, ‗what is being?' is one of the fundamental enquiries within the parameters of metaphysics. This becomes very important since metaphysics Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info univocal and not analogical. With this argument, he destroys the ground for attributing ‗beingness' solely to God. This was a view that William of Ockham, another eminent medieval philosopher agreed to. From the foregoing, if we define being as ‗that which is', it is reasonable to say that Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are correct in saying that being is a univocal concept.
Being in the modern and contemporary periods
During the Modern and Contemporary Periods, the problem of being did not feature prominently as philosophers were more concerned with the problem of substance. The problem however emerged in Hegel. He understands being as something in a dialectical process. He contrasted being with non-being, as thesis and antithesis respectively. The dialectical encounter between the thesis and antithesis is a synthesis, which is a process of becoming. Thus in Hegel, to be is to be in a process of becoming. Martin Heidegger was hugely interested in the concept of being. Being for Heidegger is not a particular being, as Aristotle and Aquinas have identified with God. For instance, you can't call a chair or a man a being. Being goes beyond particular things, it is rather the ground of all beings and the source from which all beings derive their being. Jean-Paul, as an existentialist defined being from this perspective: being is whatever is, not something hidden or mystical. He objects to any understanding of being from the perspective of derivation, participation or creation, this is because no reason can be given for its existence. He goes further to argue that the foundation of being is nothingness, for it emerged from nothing. In Jean-Paul, the religious concept of being found in Aristotle and Aquinas is discarded pointing to the natural and atheistic approaches that would dominate the Modern and Contemporary Eras. For Gabriel Marcel, a Catholic existentialist, being is a mystery and not a problem: a mystery in which we are all engulfed since we are all beings (Omoregbe, 2002) . From all these definitions through the different ages of the development of philosophy, whether being is conceived as God or a mystery or a process, being still remains that which is.
Being in African metaphysics
African philosophers like their Western counterparts have also tried to understand being in such a way that it corresponds to the African spirit. In this area, the researcher would discuss the concepts of being in Emmanuel Edeh, Pantaleon Iroegbu, and the proposal of Chi as an African concept for being.
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Edeh's presentation of Igbo philosophy of being Edeh's presentation of the concept of being in Igbo metaphysics, as one would expect was derived from Igbo ontology. He posits a notion of being that is derived from dual loci: from the Igbo language and the Igbo concept of the human person . As regards the derivation of the Igbo concept of being from the concept of the human person, Edeh says that it is born from the fact that human beings are the principal focus of the Igbo physical world, basically comprising the human and non-human. This is expressed in Igbo names and proverbs: madu-ka (Human beings are the greatest) madu-bisi (Human life is the first) (Edeh, 1985) . From the foregoing, one becomes aware of what is through an awareness of the human person as a visible concrete instance of what exists. But this would not be the area of concern in this piece. The researcher is primarily concerned with the derivation of being from the Igbo language.
From the Igbo language
Edeh's presentation of being in Igbo metaphysics reveals a deep search by a pioneer African thinker of an African concept that would equal the concept of being employed by his Western contemporaries. And since the Igbo language has no exact equivalence of being in English as he argues -The Igbo language has no word that exactly translates the English word‖ (Edeh 1985, p.93) , he draws out two hypotheses that approximate this notion: the onye and ife hypothesis.
The 'onye' hypothesis
Edeh employs the concept of onye in Igbo language to test-denote the concept of being. But he discovers that onye hypothesis is basically applicable to human beings only. What then becomes of non-human existence that cannot be described as onye? The concept of onye has three applications:
1. Onye as a pronominal clause: as a pronominal clause it means ‗who', as in -Jonathan who is the president of Nigeria‖ (Jonathan Onye bu president Nigeria). (Edeh, 1985) .
From 'onye' to 'ife' hypothesis
Having understood the limitations of onye, Edeh in his indefatigable spirit moves on to make further investigations on a more appropriate concept for being. In his investigation, he arrives at ife. According to Edeh, -the Igbo word ife primarily means thing, anything material of immaterial. It is used to refer to a happening, an event, an occurrence. Ife can also be affixed to any adjective to mean specific things‖ (Edeh 1985, p.95) . For instance, ife obuna (anything), ife ebube (thing of wonder), ife ojoo (bad thing), ife oma (good thing). After a wide and profound investigation, Edeh realizes that there is no word in Igbo language outside ife that approximates the Igbo concept of being (Igbo notion of being covers all categories of being).
And thus, he subscribes to the ife hypothesis for the following metaphysical reasons: the Igbo notion of being embraces all categories of being. The onye hypothesis on the one hand, already fails in covering all dimensions of being since it only concerns human and spiritual beings, leaving out inanimate, vegetative and non-human animate beings. Ife on the other hand, although it primarily refers to inanimate things, by expansion can include human and suprahuman beings (Edeh, 1985 From 'ife' to 'ife-di' Having arrived at the ife hypothesis, Edeh realised that ife as a concept does not bring out all that being means.
However, we must note that ife does not bring out completely all that being means. Ife does not emphasize the important aspect of being, namely, the fact of existence. Ife standing on its own can be used to refer to both existent and non-existent entities.
Hence we have to search for a way of using ife to highlight the fact of existence and exclude the possibility of nonexistence (Edeh 1985,p. 96 ).
To find a solution to this problem, Edeh combines ife and idi to get ife-idi. Idi is the Igbo verb to be. It can be used as an adjective and can also be suffixed to anything to show that it exists. For example, okwute di (the stone that exists), Nkita di (the dog that exists), Kanu di (Kanu who exists). Edeh does not end here, he goes further to bring out the categories of ife-di that corresponds to different kinds of being.
1. The suprasensory category: in the suprasensory category are beings like Chineke and Ndi muo (spirits).
The human category: the human category is subdivided into Ndi din du (the living) and Ndi Nwuru (the dead).
3. The thing category: the thing category is divided into three major groupings: anu (which means animals), ife nkiti (this covers all inanimate entities), and ogu (beings that have no existence of their own).
With this understanding of being by Edeh, the researcher would evaluate it in relation to the positions of some other African philosophers who have proposed other concepts for being in Igbo traditional thought.
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info of, or to be a member of a group. For Instance, I belong to Arondizuogu community, this gives me rights and privileges that others who do not belong to this community do not have. There is also a possessive nuance of the verb ‗to belong'. I can say that the soap belongs to me. In the first nuance, to belong creates a situation of participation and in the second, it creates a situation of possession. There is an ontological nuance of belongingness, which specifies that a thing is because it belongs. To be is to belong and to belong is to be (Anah, 2005) .
The Igbo principle of Egbe bere Ugo bere (let the kite perch, let the eagle perch) re-enacts the contents and significance of belongingness as the essence and hermeneatic core of reality . Pantaleon believes that what a being is, is its activity of perching (belonging). To perch is to be. To be is to perch. To be is to belong and to belong is to be. When Egbe perches and Ugo perches, they come face to face with each other. They are with each other. They are present to each other. They relate to each other deeply and directly as well as have relationships with other inhabitants of Uwa (world).
To relate is to share something: to give and take. They have common projects, needs and desires. Together they struggle to overcome their difficulties and share their joy .
Obviously, the idea of ‗To be is to belong and to belong is to be' may sound tautological, but it is the definitional circle involved in any description of being as being. This circle will however be clarified as the four Pantaleonine analytic connotations of belongingness is explored.
Be-(I)-on (Be on)
In this case, ‗to belong' involves ‗being on' in the Uwa (Uwa is the world in English, but in Igbo it takes up a meaningful depth. It is the entirety of existence) from which all concrete realities derive their being. To be on in this sense is to escape the contrary of being off. For either one is on or he is off . To be off is to cease to exist and to be on is to be.
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info it changes. In ancient philosophy, change and permanence was a bone of contention between Heraclitus and Parmenides, but in Igbo Metaphysics it is no problem at all. For uwa naeme ntughari (the world changes), even though, in the midst of the change Uwa bu otu (the world does not change).
Be-long
To be-long for Pantaleon (1995) means to abide, to stay or live long. In this case, it means that belongingness lives long. As such, the subject of Uwa lives long. This brings in the issue of space and time, for belongingness is expressed in space and time. Be-long extends into eternity in Igbo ontology; it goes beyond the present dimension of the Uwa to the Uwa of the ancestors, such that to be and not to be-long is not to be at all. While on-going
belongingness may be open-ended, being-long belongingness stretches into everlastingness. As such, in Pantaleon, one becomes through being-on so as to be-going, in other to be-long.
Be-longing
This speaks of being and longing to be. It stresses the longing for life and being. It is founded on the awareness that nothing is higher a value than life. Expressions in Igbo bring this home: nduka (life is greater); Ndubuisi (life is the principal thing). To long for life is to want to be, not in the abstract Uwa but in the concreteness of what Uwa offers.
Each of these themes of belongingness addresses the significance of being, and thus summarizes the essence of being as belongingness. From these analytic themes, we also come to learn that once one is tuned in being; there is no going back from its beingness. One continually goes on in being and not even death can stop one's ongoingness of being . Njoku (2010) , Okere (1983) and Abanuka (2003) 
Chi as designating the notion of being in Igbo metaphysics

Conclusion
The above study about the problem of being in metaphysics has led us through the different ages of the development of metaphysics, revealing the character of metaphysical problems as a perennial one. A cursory glance at the earliest definitions of being from the ancient philosophers, through the scholastics to Descartes and Kant as that which exist, it would be discovered that their concept of being has remained abstract and unsubstantiated. Although they have answered the question of what is being, they are yet to answer the question of what being is substantively. During the development of the concept of being by African philosophers, being assumes a more operative concept; it became something concrete and substantive. This notwithstanding, the concept of being through the ages has remained that which is. No matter how much light future thinkers may shed on this concept, it would still remain that which is.
